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Análisis filosófico
On-line version ISSN 1851-9636
Abstract
FARRELL, Martín. El alcance (acotado) del escepticismo moral. Anal. filos. [online]. 2013, vol.33, n.1, pp.47-66. ISSN 1851-9636.
Moral skepticism maintains that moral propositions are no true, nor false, according with the correspondence theory of truth, and the coherence theory of truth is not applicable in morality. To refute it, somebody has to prove the existence of moral facts, or demostrate that coherence is a sufficient condition for a good moral theory. According the paper, this cannot be done.
Keywords : Metaethics; Moral skepticism.