Abstract

BLANK, Andreas. Leibniz: sobre las presunciones y la simplicidad cognitiva. Tópicos [online]. 2020, n.39, pp.149-176. ISSN 1666-485X.

This article investigates the role of the concept of cognitive simplicity in Leibniz’s account of presumptions. Leibniz’s treatments of the connection between simplicity and presumption may contribute something significant to contemporary accounts of what makes presumptions plausible. This is so because, while contemporary accounts focus on the pragmatic side of cognitive simplicity, Leibniz sought to ground cognitive simplicity in what comes about more easily in reality. Leibniz builds on the work of early modern jurists who recommend to presume what corresponds to human nature. Leibniz gives a novel turn to this idea by invoking the notion of easiness, which he explicates in the framework of his ontology of “requisites”—that is, factors without which something could not exist or not exist in the way it does. In political decision making, Leibniz’s precept is that one should form presumptions in favor of the course of action that has fewer requisites than alternative courses of action. Likewise, his presumption in favor of an action’s being just is closely connected with his conception of easiness. The upshot of these considerations will be that it may be a good idea to de-dichotomize the distinction between cognitive simplicity and ontological simplicity.

Keywords : decision under uncertainty; rationality; probability; verisimilitude; moral modalities.