Abstract

SCHUSTER, Valeria. Los juicios de gusto en el escepticismo humeano. Tópicos [online]. 2022, n.44, e0009. ISSN 1666-485X.  http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14409/topicos.2022.44.e0009.

In our paper, David Hume’s proposal for a standard of taste within the framework of his sceptical philosophy is analysed. Our research starts from the assumption that the philosopher is not able to consolidate the basic principles of a Science of Man as he himself proposes in the Introduction of Treatise of Human Nature and that, therefore, it is not possible to distinguish which are the latest principles that rule human beings’ understanding and behaviour in several spheres of knowledge. The aesthetic experience does not escape this difficulty. In this sense, in our research, we have enquired about what Hume’s objective and purpose in the Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary are when he proposes the verdict reached by skilful judges as a guide to aesthetic evaluations. Our focus is placed on establishing why a sceptical thinker would be interested in regulating judgments of taste. Similarly, and aiming for unravelling Hume’s proposal all over its complexity, we will examine the distinctive features of the sensibility sphere, and we will consider their similarities with and differences from Hutcheson’s thought.

Keywords : David Hume; Standard of Taste; sensibility; scepticism.

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