Abstract

SELEME, Hugo Omar. Posición original, equilibrio reflexivo y deontologismo. Anal. filos. [online]. 2004, vol.24, n.1, pp.83-110. ISSN 1851-9636.

One aspect of Michael Sandel´s argument against the neutral character of justice as fairness on which little research has been done is the way in which he founds his conclusions on the basis of the understanding he has about three other aspects of the Rawlsian conception of justice: its deontological character, the reflective equilibrium and the original position. It is my aim to prove that Sandel has not made four independent mistakes but, on the contrary, to have a wrong understanding of the deontological character of the theory has driven him to a wrong characterization of what the reflective equilibrium consists of and this, in turn, has taken him to a wrong interpretation of what is modelled in the original position and, at large, to hold the idea that justice as fairness lacks neutrality. Focusing on this issue will allow us to appreciate how the different responses made by Brian Barry, Samuel Freeman and John Rawls himself against Sandel are articulated and complement one another.

Keywords : Neutrality; Sandel; Rawls.

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