Abstract

NAVARRO, Pablo E.. Lagunas de conocimiento y lagunas de reconocimiento. Anal. filos. [online]. 2006, vol.26, n.2, pp.190-228. ISSN 1851-9636.

This paper analyzes the distinction between gaps of knowledge and gaps of recognition. In Normative Systems, Alchourrón and Bulygin (henceforth, AB) claim that both indeterminacies are different problems that arise in the application of general norms to individual cases. Where through ignorance of certain properties of the facts, we cannot determine whether an individual case belongs to a generic case, we speak of gap of knowledge. On the contrary, gaps of recognitions are caused by the semantic indeterminacy of the concepts (i.e. vagueness) which define a generic case. In order to solve gaps of knowledge, jurists use legal presumptions, but the solution of a gap of knowledge requires the redefinition of a certain concept. However, AB believe that vagueness is only an epistemic problem (not a "real" semantic one). For this reason, they conclude that a complete normative system resolves every possible individual case even though we can still find epistemic indeterminacies. However, this paper shows that if vagueness is characterized as an epistemic problem, there will be no relevant reason for stressing the distinction between gaps of recognition and gaps of knowledge.

Keywords : Normative system; Legal gaps; Vagueness.

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