Abstract

BOHMER, Martín  and  SCATAGLINI, María Gabriela. ¿Un Bulygin pragmático?. Anal. filos. [online]. 2013, vol.33, n.1, pp.11-29. ISSN 1851-9636.

We contrast Bulygin's position on rules against that of the semantic skeptic and the inclusionist. We understand these two positions as in some sense expressing two general approaches on behavior according to rules: a) the first one stating that ruled behavior is no more than "arbitrary decisions," mere reactions or behavioral habits, and b) the second one explaining everything normative as actions adjusted to rules or principles (explicit or possible to be rendered explicit). Bulygin's general notion according to which rules are propositions or conceptual entities paradoxically seems to be close to a skeptic position when facing the impossibility of completely listing implicit exceptions when formulating a rule. We propose an alternative conception based on the notion that meaning is shown in use, understanding by "use" the mastering of a technique that constitutes a social practice, in which resides a sort of correction (in) practice. This correction does not depend on explicit justifications but on an unexpressed background which makes impossible a theory of legal application of rules.

Keywords : Norms; Neaning as use; Implicit exceptions; Background; No-theory.

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