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Análisis filosófico

On-line version ISSN 1851-9636

Abstract

RIMOLDI, Florencia. Can Knowledge be a State of Mind?. Anal. filos. [online]. 2014, vol.34, n.2, pp.171-201. ISSN 1851-9636.

In Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson defends the strong thesis that knowledge is a mental state (CEMf), while offering a characterization of knowledge according to which it is the "most general factive stative attitude". This characterization becomes central to the Project once we assume that perceptual states are also factive stative attitudes. This proposal has been widely discussed in the literature. In this paper I propose a novel objection against (CEMf) by using the very same tools that Williamson deploys on behalf of his view. I will argue, in different stages, that perceptual states are not factive stative attitudes. my criticism is not limited to showing that the characterization of knowledge in terms of factive stative attitudes is false, it also shows that (CEMf) is implausible.

Keywords : Factividad.

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