Abstract

KARCZMARCZYK, Pedro Diego. Wittgenstein without Intricacies: Meaning Scepticism and Autonomy of Grammar. Anal. filos. [online]. 2020, vol.40, n.1, pp.93-121. ISSN 1851-9636.  http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.332.

This paper analyses the two main thesis of the recently published Pérez Otero’s book Vericuetos de la filosofía de Wittgenstein: the revision of the general symmetry between actions and omissions as intentional behaviour, and the proposal of a “teleological” (etiological) dispositional answer to Kripke’s Wittgenstein sceptical challenge. Concerning the first thesis, we show that the grammar of attributions of intentions is neutral regarding causal determinism because of the retrospective character of attributions illustrated by the concept of “justification post hoc”. Regarding the second thesis, we stress that the refusal of internism is not enough to ground a satisfactory explanation of rule-following on teleological dispositions, and we show that Pérez Otero misunderstands the kind of problem posed by the Kripke’s Wittgenstein meaning scepticism, which implies to abandon the conception that makes of “rule-following” the “praxis of a subject” for another that regards rule-followers as the “subjects of a practice”.

Keywords : Rule-Following; Intentional Action; Meaning-Scepticism.

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