SciELO - Scientific Electronic Library Online

 
vol.44 issue2The Sources of Subjectivity in Hegel’s “Anthropology” and His Interpretation of “Animal Magnetism”Expression and Force: Forms of Bare Functionality by G. W Leibniz author indexsubject indexarticles search
Home Pagealphabetic serial listing  

Services on Demand

Journal

Article

Indicators

  • Have no cited articlesCited by SciELO

Related links

  • Have no similar articlesSimilars in SciELO

Share


Revista latinoamericana de filosofía

On-line version ISSN 1852-7353

Abstract

NASCIMENTO, DANIEL SIMAO. Aristotle on the Normative Value of Friendship Duties. Rev. latinoam. filos. [online]. 2018, vol.44, n.2, pp.1-23. ISSN 1852-7353.

In this article, I present an interpre-tation of Aristotle’s thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties. The argument is divided in VII sections. In Section I, I provide brief summaries of the main arguments defended by me in a previous article about the normative consequences of virtue and utility friendships in Aristotle, the objectives that are to be defended in this article and of the conclusions that I take them to support. In section II, I offer an inter-pretation ofAristotle’s thought regarding the normative value of friendship duties in cases where there is no practical conflict between friendship duties. In section III, I outline Aristotle’s theory about how we should deal with cases where there is such practical conflict. In the next sections, I analyze three other passages of the Aristotelian corpus where we have good reason to think that this kind of conflict appears, namely, NE, III 1, 1110a20-29 (IV), Pol, III 10, 1286b23-28 (V) and Rol., VII 9, 1330a9-25 (VI), in order to flesh out the outline presented in section III. In section VII I conclude with a summary of the argument.

Keywords : Aristóteles, amistad, deber, justicia..

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in English     · English ( pdf )

 

Creative Commons License All the contents of this journal, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License