Abstract

SARAIVA, Ignacio  and  MELOGNO, Pablo. Por qué el fundacionismo no funciona: una respuesta a Miguel Ángel Rendón Rojas. Palabra clave [online]. 2023, vol.13, n.1, e200. ISSN 1853-9912.  http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24215/18539912e200.

Rendón Rojas has recently defended the idea that disciplines and particularly, information science, need some kind of foundation for their development. At the same time, in his attack on anti-foundationalism, he refers to the fact that it is not possible because it is unfeasible to evade the principle of sufficient reason, and that its adoption leads to relativism and subjectivism. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to develop a critical discussion of Rendón Rojas's proposal, from an anti-foundationalist perspective. To do this, a literature review is carried out and are analyzed the various variants of foundationalism as a philosophical current, in order to establish the main criticisms that have been made of it. Sellars' arguments are presented when considering foundationalism and the myth of the given. The criticisms of relativity and subjectivity made to anti-foundationalism are examined. A critical discussion is carried out on the principle of sufficient reason as a bastion for the disciplines, it is sustained that its presentation is an area of controversy and debate. Also, it presented an anti-foundationalist vision for information science. It is concluded that anti-foundationalism offers a fertile field when it comes to thinking about how scientific disciplines are consolidated, how they achieve consensus and community agreements.

Keywords : Foundationalism; Anti-foundationalism; Principle of sufficient reason; Epistemology; Information science.

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