Resumen

SIECKMANN, Jan. "Concepción puente" y "concepción insular". Anal. filos. [online]. 2013, vol.33, n.2, pp.211-222. ISSN 1851-9636.

The traditional conception of legal argumentation is that legal cases are resolved by means of subsumption and deduction. Hugo Zuleta disputes this position, rejecting the "bridge conception" of norms, which was defended in particular by Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin. According to the "bridge conception", the conditional norm includes a deontic modality only in its consequence, whilst the antecedent consists of a descriptive sentence (p → oq). By contrast, Zuleta defends the "isle conception", which puts the deontic modality in front of the conditional (O(p → q)). I will discuss these conceptions, assessing their adequacy in distinct fields of application. In particular, I will defend the thesis that the critique of the "bridge conception" is correct in the case of norm conflicts. Thus, the "isle conception" can have an important application in the theory of principles and the analysis of norm conflicts.

Palabras clave : Deontic logic; Deduction; Conditional norms; Norm conflict; Principles.

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