Resumen

PERINETTI, Darío. Inferencia y racionalidad en Hegel. Rev. latinoam. filos. [online]. 2009, vol.35, n.2, pp.253-285. ISSN 1852-7353.

Hegel's Logic is usually read as a book in metaphysics. Against this reading, I will argue that it ought rather to be read as a philosophy of logic, the main feature of which is its critique of formalism. The following claims capture the core of Hegel's anti-formalism: 1) formalism cannot explain logical validity; 2) logical properties cannot be reduced to grammatical properties; 3) the content of every concept can be accounted for in terms of the inferential relations it holds with other concepts; 4) logical validity can be accounted for in terms of the relations a reasoning maintains with some conceptual contents (Ideas). This conception of logic results from a Criradicalisation of a Kantian thesis and aims at a normative theory of conceptual practices, not at an ontology.

Palabras clave : Hegel; Logic; Reason; Semantics; Concepts.

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