Resumo

AGUIRRE, Lisandro. Las creencias involuntarias en Sexto Empírico y Hume. Tópicos [online]. 2008, n.16, pp.5-20. ISSN 1666-485X.

The object of study in this paper is belief. Our aim is to show how, through this concept, Hume's modern and Pirro's ancient scepticism may converge into a fairly similar position. Both the theoretical and at the same time practical attitudes consider it licit to "assent to what presents itself to man in an unavoidable way and independently from our will". As we now, there is for Sixtus as well as for Hume something, regardless of the name we give it ("phainómenon", "perceptions"), which "induces" us to or "demands" assent from us, [the latter being] a fundamental term which seems to indicate a concept common to both, ancient scepticism and Hume's thought. Would it then be legitimate or justified to keep giving our support to that statement of history that called Hume first an "empiricist" and afterwards a "naturalist"? Would it not be more accurate to trace some pirronism, even unconscious, in the Scot's ideas? Our answer starts off from Michael Frede's non-traditional interpretation, who somewhat firmly set up the idea that the sceptical resign having beliefs, or at least, can have them without by it trespassing the epoché. The central issue will then be to determine which meaning should be attributed to the term "belief".

Palavras-chave : Hume; Sixtus; Belief; Assent; Epoché.

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