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Análisis filosófico

versão On-line ISSN 1851-9636

Resumo

DEVITT, Michael. Buenos Aires Symposium on Rigidity: responses. Anal. filos. [online]. 2009, vol.29, n.2, pp.239-251. ISSN 1851-9636.

In this article the following criticisms of the essentialist conception of general term rigidity presented in the previous papers are considered and responded: (i) the identity of designation conception of rigidity can provide us with a better alternative account for general term rigidity (Orlando), and (ii) the essentialist conception fails to meet the condition of extensional adequacy, both because it (allegedly) over -and undergeneralizes (Zerbudis). Against (i), it is claimed that the proposed definition of general term rigidity cannot feature in lost rigidity arguments against description theories because it is circular, and then fails to do the primary work that rigidity is supposed to do, namely, distinguishing terms that are covered by a description theory from those that are not. As regards (ii), after insisting that the essentialist view need not be commited to the condition of extensional adequacy, both charges of over- and undergeneralization are addressed: while the argumentation aimed at showing that some examples (such as 'paperweight') are cases of overgeneralization is rejected, the cases of undergeneralization (of the likes of 'frog') are admitted to be still in need of a better explanation than the one given in Devitt (2005).

Palavras-chave : Rigidity; Designation; Description theories of terms; General term; Natural kind term.

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