Resumo

ORUNESU, Claudina  e  RODRIGUEZ, Jorge L.. Validez, reconocimiento y potestades normativas. Anal. filos. [online]. 2013, vol.33, n.2, pp.145-169. ISSN 1851-9636.

How is it possible to ground the legal validity of those rules whose creation cannot be assessed as regular or irregular by reference to any other legal rule? Kelsen's basic norm and Hart's rule of recognition are among the most famous answers to this question, but both ideas have been seriously challenged. Eugenio Bulygin has made decisive contributions to this discussion. He has shown that in the analysis of the ultimate ground of validity of legal rules, two different senses of validity should be distinguished: a prescriptive and a descriptive sense, and that the Kelsenian basic norm is nothing but the product of confusion between these two different senses. He has also claimed that the rule of recognition has to be understood as a conceptual rule specifying the criteria of identification of legal rules, and those power-conferring rules cannot be interpreted as prescriptive norms of conduct. Although these contributions have provided a basic framework for a possible solution, Bulygin's ideas need a refinement in order to be considered as a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the ultimate ground of legal validity.

Palavras-chave : Validity; Basic Norm; Rule of Recognition; Power Conferring Norms.

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