Resumo

VIDAL, Javier. A Theory of the First-Person Concept. Anal. filos. [online]. 2016, vol.36, n.2, pp.171-198. ISSN 1851-9636.

Following Peacocke's approach to the nature of concepts, this paper presents a possession condition theory of the first-person concept. I propose that such a possession condition is a matter of, necessarily, one's being disposed to make a higher-order judgement with the content <I am the thinker that I am F> just when one has a conscious thought with the content <I am F>. Accordingly, I try to motivate and defend this view responding to supposed counterexamples. In addition, I provide a theory of the determination of the semantic value as to how that possession condition individuates the first-person concept by giving the condition that someone has to satisfy in order to be its referent.

Palavras-chave : First-person Concept; Higher-order Judgement; Possession Condition; Theory of the Determination; Peacocke.

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