Resumo

MUNTAABSKI, Bruno Gabriel. Adoption, Logical Presupposition and Inferential Practice. Anal. filos. [online]. 2022, vol.42, n.2, pp.339-366.  Epub 20-Out-2022. ISSN 1851-9636.  http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.689.

The adoption problem, developed by Kripke (2021) and elaborated by Padró (2015, 2021), has generated considerable debate in the philosophy of language and logic due to its consequences for theories of rationality and of the nature of logical principles. It has been proposed that there is an intimate relationship between this problem and the meta-referential inconsistency argument directed against the monist defense of a non-classical logic. This has led to the belief that Kripke’s stance against the adoption of logical principles implies a criticism of non-classical logical monism. This paper evaluates the difficulties implicit in this interpretation of the argument, in the way it has been developed by Barrio, Fiore and Pailos (2021). It is argued that this interpretation ignores key elements of both Kripke’s argument and conclusion. An alternative way of interpreting the nature of the problem is presented, arguing it exhibits both philosophical and exegetical advantages for analyzing the adoption problem. This is intended to contribute to the understanding of the complex kripkean problem and its relation to contemporary debates regarding logical monism.

Palavras-chave : Adoption; Inconsistency; Logic change; Non-classical logics; Inferential practice.

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