Resumo

VIDAL, Javier. Fuerza, contenido y la metafísica del juicio. Anal. filos. [online]. 2023, vol.43, n.1, pp.41-68.  Epub 01-Maio-2023. ISSN 1851-9636.  http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2023.468.

The Frege-Geach problem relates to give an account of the same propositional content appearing in different contexts both affirmed and not affirmed. It is a major challenge for a view in which a predicative proposition is inherently committal. Fairly, Peter Hanks has recently supported such a view by holding that an act of predication is a judgement. He then faces the Frege-Geach problem by arguing that some contexts cancel the normal commitment with the truth. But according to several critics, there is a dilemma here of either cancellation leaving us with something minus predication or leaving us with predication minus commitment. In this paper, I propose an approach to the dilemma that appeals to the non-committal nature of propositions but saves the close link between predication and judgement. I also try to explain such a close link by developing a metaphysics of judgement in terms of grounding between facts, with facts about judgement only partially grounded in facts about predication.

Palavras-chave : Grounding; Judgement; Predication; Frege-Geach Problem; Proposition.

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